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Abstract 
 
Viral samples of avian influenza are essential to preparing pre-pandemic vaccines. 
In 2007, the conflicting interests of the developed and developing nations led 
Indonesia to briefly stop sharing viral samples. The result was a struggle in which 
the two blocs argued for different paradigms for viral sample sharing. The first 
paradigm, articulated by the developed world, depicted the issue as one of health 
security, in which international law mandated the sharing of viral samples. The 
second paradigm, advanced by the developing world, depicted viral sample sharing 
as a form of biopiracy, which violated countries’ sovereign control of their biological 
resources. Ultimately, the second paradigm proved more politically effective, 
enabling developing nations to achieve many of their goals through the WHO’s 2011 
pandemic influenza plan. This paper examines how this plan was shaped by 
Indonesia’s argument that the global public good required a new approach to global 
health governance, in order to eliminate neocolonial power relationships.  
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Introduction 
 
Influenza poses some nearly unique issues in global health governance. The global 
community is haunted by the memory of 1918, when perhaps as many as 100 million people died 
during a major influenza pandemic. Despite the continued circulation of highly pathogenic avian 
influenza (HPAI), particularly in South-East Asia and Egypt, the virus directly affects only small 
numbers of people today. For this reason, influenza lacks the patient advocacy organizations that 
are a critical aspect of health policy for illnesses such as HIV/AIDS. Accordingly, the most 
important actors in influenza policy are often not patient groups but rather states, which 
collaborate with pharmaceutical organizations and international organizations such as the World 
Health Organization (WHO). However, the national interests of the developing and the 
developed nations do not always coincide, particularly with regard to the issue of viral sample 
sharing for pre-pandemic vaccines. Accordingly, the two blocs view this issue in terms of 
competing paradigms. For developed countries, international law requires developing countries 
to share samples in order to support global health security (Elbe, 2010, pp. 476-477; Franklin, 
2009, pp. 355-372). For developing countries, viral sample sharing has at times been perceived 
as a form of biopiracy, which maintains neocolonial relationships and ensures the dependency of 
developing countries upon the developed world. This issue came to a head in 2007, when 
Indonesia briefly stopped sharing viral samples of influenza strains with the World Health 
Organization. This paper will consider the competing views of the developed and developing 
world during this standoff, and how the World Health Organization has sought to resolve the 
differences with its Pandemic Influenza Plan of 2011. In the end, the developing world won a 
limited victory, in part because biopiracy proved to be a more effective tool to frame the issue 
politically than did international law and security. 
 
Influenza and Vaccines 
 
The influenza virus is a very contagious agent that infects many animals, in which it can 
cause diverse symptoms, as well as humans, for whom it is mainly a respiratory disease. Because 
it is a highly mutagenic virus, periodic pandemics sweep the globe, of which the most 
devastating in modern history occurred in 1918 (Barry, 2005). As Alfred Crosby and Arno 
Karlen have argued, one of the most unusual aspects of the influenza pandemic was that for a 
time, it was largely forgotten amongst the general population (Crosby, 1990; Karlen, 1995, p. 
145). Global health authorities, however, always remained aware of the dangers that influenza 
poses. In 1997, an outbreak of HPAI in Hong Kong sickened eighteen people and killed six. The 
government killed more than a million chickens in a few days, which stamped out the outbreak 
(Davis, 2005, pp. 45-54). In 2003 and 2004, bird flu again appeared in South East Asia, 
particularly in Vietnam, and it has since spread to countries as geographically distant as Turkey 
and Indonesia. While H5N1 receives the most media coverage, other strains of the virus also 
pose a threat. For example, in February 2004, an outbreak of a different strain of HPAI in the 
Fraser Valley of British Columbia caused the Canadian Food Inspection Agency to order the 
destruction of nearly twenty million chickens (Davis, 2005, pp. 94-95). Then, in 2009, a new 
form of influenza, novel H1N1 (the so-called swine flu) emerged in Mexico. While this form of 
the virus did not prove to have a high mortality, the outbreak led to intense planning by global 
health authorities as well as widespread media coverage.  
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 As is well known, the current vaccine system for influenza suffers from multiple 
weaknesses (Osterholm, Kelly, Sommer, & Belangia, 2012; Youde, 2008, p. 151). The flu virus 
mutates rapidly, and there are many different strains, each characterized by different proteins in 
their outer shell. Every year, scientists scour the planet looking for different forms of the virus. 
They then guess which forms will likely dominate epidemics in the coming winter (for each 
hemisphere). They come to a consensus on three different forms. It then takes months to grow 
the virus in chicken eggs. One challenge is that vaccine designers sometimes guess incorrectly, 
and a virus strain that is not covered by that year’s vaccine will circulate widely. Another risk is 
that a novel form of the virus will appear for which the vaccine developers are completely 
unprepared. 
 The current vaccine technology has other limitations, including its reliance upon millions 
of chicken eggs, which could be difficult to obtain if an avian influenza pandemic wiped out 
chicken farms. Contamination can also be a challenge, as proved the case in October 2004, when 
a plant owned by Chiron in the United Kingdom produced a vaccine contaminated by a bacteria. 
This one failure meant that the US health system lost tens of millions of expected doses of 
vaccine (Davis, 2005, 140-144). The US media asked how the country could deal with pandemic 
flu if it could not guarantee a vaccine supply in a normal year. For this reason, as well as to 
shorten the time required for vaccine preparation there is currently a major effort to create new 
vaccine technologies. Pharmaceutical companies are also seeking to create pre-pandemic 
vaccines based on viral samples from the wild in order to shorten the time needed for the 
preparation of a vaccine in case of a pandemic. In addition, nations are stockpiling or signing 
advance contracts for one of the four drugs currently used to treat influenza (Yamada, 2009; Elbe, 
2010, p. 480; Vezzani, 2010, p. 681). 
 Even before the 2009 pandemic, efforts to fight the flu raised key moral questions. 
European and North American governments collectively spent billions of dollars stockpiling 
medications, testing vaccines, and encouraging basic research on the flu, while developing 
nations struggling to contain avian influenza found comparatively little aid forthcoming for tasks 
such as culling infected flocks. With the emergence of H1N1, developed countries re-activated 
pre-existing contracts with major vaccine manufacturers in order to give their countries first 
access to the vaccines produced. The manufacturers would not take orders from poorer but more 
populous countries because the manufacturers lacked the capacity to fill such orders. As Marcel 
Verweij (2009, pp. 207-209) has noted, nations such as Australia, Canada, and the Netherlands 
were able to receive vaccine, and the WHO could only ask these nations to share excess vaccine 
with developing countries. Nations such as Mexico resented being unable to access needed 
vaccines and medicines in a timely fashion. For some nations affected by HPAI (such as 
Cambodia, Indonesia, and Vietnam), it was difficult not to conclude that they were living in a 
“sacrifice zone,” from which viral samples were extracted while the needs of the population were 
ignored. Because wealthy countries dominated the global infrastructure of vaccine factories, 
laboratories, and pharmaceutical companies, research did not necessarily protect much of the 
world’s population from influenza. Rather, from the perspective of front-line states, the global 
health system maintained their dependence on wealthy countries, which first secured the needs of 
its peoples, keeping the governments of poorer states as supplicants. As such, the global health 
system embodied neocolonial relationships. 
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Indonesia 
 
Inevitably, developing nations proved reluctant to collaborate with First World nations to 
develop pre-pandemic vaccines because it appeared unlikely that developing nations would 
benefit from such cooperation. In 2007, this issue came to a head when Indonesia learned that the 
World Health Organization had shared a viral sample collected in Indonesia with a 
pharmaceutical company, which had then modified and patented the virus. The company 
allegedly then offered to sell the vaccine to Indonesia for protection against the strain of virus 
circulating in that country (Franklin, 2009, p. 356; Stephenson, 2011, p. 623; Vezzani, 2010, pp. 
677-678). This was not the only such case in which genetic sequences from viral samples 
collected in Indonesia and other countries such as Vietnam (Vezzani, 2010, 677) were used by 
pharmaceutical companies, but it added to mounting Indonesian frustration with obstacles to 
their nation’s pandemic preparedness planning. For example, as early as 2005, Indonesia’s health 
minister had found that she could not purchase Tamiflu because Western countries were 
allegedly stockpiling all production (Elbe, 2010, pp. 480-481). In response to this final incident, 
Indonesian health authorities decided to stop sharing viral samples with the WHO and to make 
proprietary arrangements to exchange viral samples for vaccine from a pharmaceutical company 
directly: 
In January, frustrated that an Indonesian strain of the virus had been used to make 
a vaccine that most Indonesians would not be able to afford, the country stopped 
cooperating with the WHO and made a deal to send samples to Baxter Healthcare, 
an American company, in return for a low-cost vaccine and help in building 
vaccine factories in Indonesia. Some other poor countries applauded the move and 
debated whether to follow suit, a move that could have set back global vaccine 
research. Yesterday, Indonesia’s health minister, Siti Fadilah Supari, told 
reporters in Jakarta that she would resume sending samples to the WHO 
“immediately.” (McNeil, 2007, p. 2) 
This resolution proved ephemeral, however, and Indonesia continued to insist on more 
sweeping changes to the global health order.  In response, developed countries and the 
World Health Organization tried to point to international law and, in particular, the 
International Health Regulations. From Indonesia’s perspective, the existing system did 
not address their concerns or national interests. Based on Indonesian interpretation of 
international law, the country was willing to share the virus samples only with parties that 
agreed to sign Material Transfer Agreements (Fidler, 2007; see Mullis, 2009, pp. 947-
948; Stephenson, 2011, p. 623; Franklin, 2009, p. 357). Indonesian officials and 
bureaucrats pointed out that the International Health Regulations, which were revised in 
2005, did not specifically state that nations had to share biological samples (Seyaningsih, 
Isfandari, Soendor, & Supari, 2008, p. 484; Franklin, 2009, pp. 362-363).  
As Harley Feldbaum and Joshua Michaud have argued (2010), developing countries 
believed that the 2005 revisions of the International Health Regulations were undertaken so as to 
reflect the interests of the most powerful countries:  
 [T]he IHR were adopted because they served powerful state interests, and, accordingly, 
some developing countries view the IHR as an instrument of the foreign policy and 
national security interests of developed countries seeking protection from epidemics 
emanating abroad, and, therefore, as only an extension of age-old power politics. (p. 7)  
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In short, there remain substantial concerns within the developing world regarding both the 
overall structure of global health governance and the independence of the World Health 
Organization from the pharmaceutical companies (Cohen & Carter, 2010, p. 2912). 
Indonesia and other developing countries argued that legally, pharmaceutical 
companies could not develop vaccines using seed stocks from developing countries 
without the countries’ permission:  
The fact that pharmaceutical companies had access to Indonesian [vaccine seed] 
viruses that were shared with the WHO affiliated laboratories was not only in 
violation [again] of the WHO guidance for virus sharing (March 2005), but [it] 
also—as strongly argued by Indonesia—revealed the unfairness and inequities of 
the global system. (Sedyaningsih, et al., 2008, p. 486) 
In February 2007, the WHO sent representatives to Indonesia, which had agreed in 
March to resume sharing samples on a provisional basis. By May of 2007, a working 
group was formed to begin studying this problem (Sedyaningsih, et al., 2008, p. 486; 
Franklin, 2009, pp. 358-359). Still, this work had yet to overcome widely divergent 
interpretations of the problem in developing countries and the developed world. 
 
Biopiracy and Viral Sovereignty 
 
Many developing countries supported Indonesia’s position. From the perspective 
of these countries, the WHO was not a disinterested party. Journalist Edward Hammond 
(2009) captured their viewpoint, asking:  
How did it come to pass that the WHO’s global surveillance system acts as a free 
virus collection and R&D department for the world’s largest vaccine companies, 
with familiar names such as Sanofi-Pasteur, Novartis, and Astra-Zeneca, yet give 
very little benefit to developing countries?  
Developing countries were particularly infuriated when pharmaceutical companies 
patented viral strains that had been obtained without permission from the countries in 
which they were created (Hammond, 2009). From the developing countries’ perspective, 
this was a case of biopiracy, little different from Henry Wickham’s stealing rubber 
seedlings in Brazil for Britain in the late nineteenth century, which led to the end of 
Brazil’s rubber boom, or Richard Spruce’s successful collection of the seeds of the 
cinchona tree, which ended the Andean monopoly on quinine.  
For people in developing countries, this was an emotional issue. After the US 
patent office gave a patent for turmeric to researchers at the University of Mississippi 
Medical Center in 2005, the Indian government had to fight to prove that Indians had 
long been aware of the medical benefits of turmeric. They succeeded after a decade long 
legal battle (Philip, 2010, p. 250). With intellectual property law permitting the patenting 
of life forms, people in developing countries now feared that the Trade Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) clause of the World Trade Organization (WTO) could be 
used to enforce companies’ claims over viruses originally collected from developing 
nations. But could viruses be thought of as resources in the same manner as plants? If so, 
could a pathogen be considered an aspect of biodiversity under the Convention on 
Biological Diversity or CBD (Mullis, 2009, p. 955; Fidler, 2008, pp. 88-94; Caplan & 
Curry, 2007, pp. 1-2)? In this case, developing countries could argue that the Rio de 
Janeiro Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) covered the genetic sequences of 
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viruses collected in their countries so that viruses were sovereign property (Vezzani, 
2010, p. 678). 
In order to justify her position, Indonesian Minister of Health, Supari created a new 
doctrine, which she labeled “viral sovereignty.” In this paradigm, viruses formed part of the 
biological patrimony of the nations in which they were found, which held exclusive rights to 
them. This idea attracted support amongst developing countries, such as India, in part because 
this argument strengthened the developing countries’ position relative to the pharmaceutical 
companies that provided vaccines. Other front-line states also adopted the Indonesian position.   
Thailand raised similar issues at WHO’s Executive Board meeting in January 2007, and its 
representative argued: 
We are sending our virus [samples] to the rich countries to produce antivirals and 
vaccines. And when the pandemic occurs, they survive and we die. . . . We are not 
opposed to sharing of information and virus [samples, but we will share them] on the 
condition that every country will have equal opportunity to get access to vaccine and 
antivirals if such a pandemic occurs. (Fidler, 2007)  
Thailand’s position was also voiced by other developing countries, including those nations not 
directly impacted by HPAI such as Brazil, Iran, Libya, and Nigeria (Franklin, 2009, pp. 366, 
369-370; Vezzani, 2010, p. 678).  
Intellectual property scholars such as Simone Vezzani (2010, pp. 678-679) have argued 
against Supari’s position because the original intent of the CBD treaty was to protect indigenous 
knowledge and encourage the conservation of nature. In this context, the interpretation of the 
treaty to include the preservation of viruses is problematic, he says, because viruses only become 
truly alive as part of human biology. Developed countries could therefore argue that the concept 
of “viral sovereignty” represented a misinterpretation of the CBD’s intent. The debates that took 
place over limiting the transfer of plant genetic resources now shaped those that took place 
regarding viral sample sharing, despite significant differences in their political context (Vezzani, 
2010, p. 685). Still, the concept of “viral sovereignty” represented a useful tool for developing 
countries to argue that for the global public good, there had to be a balance between the demand 
for viral samples on the part of developed countries and the need for more of the benefits of the 
vaccine created from those samples in the poorer nations most affected by HPAI. 
In May of 2007, Indonesia raised questions pertaining to this conundrum at a meeting of 
the World Health Assembly (Vezzani, 2010, p. 670). During this meeting, developing countries 
launched a critique of how the World Health Organization had shared viral seed stock samples: 
In the course of these deliberations, it emerged that WHO had not abided by the 
terms of the 2005 WHO guidelines on sharing of viruses, which required the 
consent of donor countries before WHO’s collaborating centers could pass on the 
viruses (other than the vaccine strains) to third parties such as vaccine 
manufacturers. While discouraging the use of material transfer agreements 
(MTAs) at the point when donor countries transferred their virus samples to the 
WHO, WHO’s collaborating centers nonetheless resorted to MTAs when they 
transferred to third parties’ vaccine strains containing parts of the viruses supplied 
by developing countries such as Indonesia, Vietnam and China.  Indeed, WHO’s 
collaborating centers themselves, as well as third parties, had sought patents 
covering parts of the source viruses used in developing vaccines and diagnostics. 
(Khoon, 2010) 
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Perhaps because of these revelations, twenty developing countries entered a resolution to the 
World Health Assembly “calling for a new international framework to be set up for the sharing 
of avian influenza viruses, to review the existing WHO research system, and to prioritize the 
manufacture and availability of vaccines in developing countries” (Khor, 2007). The resolution 
stated that any “vaccines, diagnostics, anti-virals, and other medical supplies arising from the use 
of the virus and parts thereof must be made available at an affordable price and in a timely 
manner to the developing countries, particularly to those under the most serious threat or already 
experiencing the pandemic threat” (Khor, 2007). 
This resolution was opposed by the United States, which was particularly concerned that 
changes to the Material Transfer Agreements (which governed viral seed stock sharing) might 
undermine global collaboration to produce vaccines against pandemic strains of the vaccine. In 
the end, the World Health Assembly passed a resolution calling on the WHO to create a vaccine 
stockpile, as well as new rules regarding influenza virus sample sharing  (Khoon, 2010; Fidler, 
2008). Based on this vote, Indonesia returned to sharing viral samples with the WHO, as part of 
the Global Influenza Surveillance Network (GISN) (Irwin, 2010). 
 Indonesia continued to successfully push its position at a series of international forums 
over the coming months: 
A hastily organized WHO consultation in Singapore began on 31 July 2007, only 
weeks after the WHA. Although the Singapore meeting was privately described 
by one WHO official as an attempt to “ambush” the Indonesian negotiator, the 
ambush backfired when Indonesia tabled a detailed proposal to restructure the 
WHO system, including material transfer agreements, improved access to 
vaccines, and new terms of reference to govern the relationships between the 
WHO, GISN labs, industry and developing countries. (Hammond, 2009) 
By the end of the year, the US was reconsidering its opposition to material transfer 
agreements, while the WHO had decided to undertake a sustained effort to address the 
issue. 
 At first, the developed countries had tried to advance their position based not only on 
international law but also upon the argument that health was a security issue, as Stefan Elbe 
(2010) has argued. As Elbe noted, however, there were costs to this argument. Indonesians 
bitterly resented the accusation that they or their actions had undermined the security interests of 
the US and other developed countries. In return, US government officials publically denounced 
Indonesia’s position, and articles in the popular media reflected the perspective that Indonesia’s 
actions posed a security threat. For example, public health journalist Laurie Garrett and Richard 
Holbroke published an article in the Washington Post to denounce the notion of viral sovereignty, 
which they argued would undermine the kind of global cooperation required to face the next 
influenza pandemic. The authors called on China to use its influence with Indonesia and for the 
United States to exercise “muscular diplomacy.” Indonesia perceived itself to be isolated for 
challenging the hegemony of the powers that kept it vulnerable and was angered by the intensity 
of the attacks it faced from the US. Stefan Elbe (2010) has made the argument that it was 
precisely because avian flu was increasingly viewed in terms of security that the standoff 
between the West and Indonesia became so severe. 
From the US perspective, the costs of this confrontation with Indonesia became excessive. 
In particular, the Department of Defense maintained a Naval Medical Research unit (NAMRU 2) 
in Jakarta, which became caught up in the standoff. The Indonesians were increasingly reluctant 
to renew the agreement that would enable this research center to continue operating. Indonesia’s 
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health minister made inflammatory comments about both the center and the developed countries, 
which she suggested might be creating biological weapons out of this research, even though the 
US had joined the Biological Weapons Convention in 1975. These comments caused a media 
firestorm when she published her book, Time for the World to Change: God is Behind the Avian 
Influenza Virus. Supari may have been surprised by the attention the work attracted, as “the 
English translation of the book was officially withdrawn by her (due to what she claims were 
inaccuracies in translation)” (Elbe 2010, p. 480). Many people within Indonesia were critical of 
Supari’s comments (Foster, 2009, pp. 46-49). Even outside of Indonesia, however, there were 
suspicions regarding US biodefense activities, of which it was said that “…if a nation were 
planning to use biological weapons, this is exactly the course they would follow: developing 
vaccines or other prophylactic treatments to protect their own troops” (King, 2010, p. 404; Elbe, 
2010, p. 482). It has also been suggested that Supari’s real concern may have been that the 
facility in question would share viral samples with US government agencies, which would have 
undermined Indonesia’s bargaining position both with the WHO and with the developed world. 
The larger issue remained after Supari ended her term as Minister of Health. The Indonesians 
were reluctant to give NAMRU 2’s employees diplomatic immunity, as the US requested, while 
government officials were angered that a former NAMRU employee had harshly critiqued their 
response to the avian influenza threat. In the end, in 2008 the center closed, only to reopen with a 
new name (Indonesia-United States Center for Medical Research, or IUC) as a non-military 
center. Indonesia’s new Health Minister, Endang Rahayu Sedyaningsih, said NAMRU 2’s 
character as a military unit made its continued operation impossible (Maulia, 2009; Normile, 
2008, pp. 598-599). For the US, the costs of the confrontation had both been high and had 
illustrated the risks of framing health issues in security terms.  
 
The Role of the World Health Organization 
 
From the start of the crisis, people had looked to the WHO to broker an agreement. For 
example, in February 2007, the medical journal The Lancet published an editorial in response to 
Indonesia’s declaration, which said that the WHO needed to achieve an agreement that would 
demonstrate solidarity in preparing for the next pandemic (Khoon, 2010). The need for a 
successful resolution was made clear by the 2009 pandemic. During the crisis, poor nations could 
not access vaccines:  
Despite appeals to humanitarian solidarity and to enlightened self-interest, almost all of 
the first billion doses of H1N1 vaccine produced in 2009 were allotted to 12 wealthy 
nations which had made advance orders. Sanofi Pasteur and GlaxoSmithKline pledged 
120 million doses to the WHO for distribution to poor countries, but even those pledges 
could be fulfilled only months after the pandemic had waned. (Khoon, 2010)  
In response, health journalist Laurie Garrett warned that events seemed to be proving Supari’s 
fears to be correct (Khoon, 2010). Even while the epidemic waned, developing countries 
remained uncertain whether they might receive unused vaccine from wealthy countries (Verweij, 
2009, pp. 207-209). 
Expectations were low for a breakthrough. Most observers agreed that the reason that 
global health governance had not changed was because the status quo favored the interests of the 
most powerful nation-states (Fidler, 2010). Indonesian authors emphasized this point:  
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Poor countries have no bargaining position because their participation in the production 
of these products is not valued as they are “just” natural resources (clinical specimens, 
viruses, and other microbes); on the other hand, the industrialized countries’ 
contributions are highly valued because they are human invented technology. 
(Sedyaningsih et al., 2008, p. 487)  
Nonetheless, an agreement was reached, which represented a bargain to reconcile the needs of 
the developed and developing world. 
 
The Pandemic Influenza Plan, PIP 
 
 Four years of negotiations came to a head in April 2011, when a working group of 
member states agreed upon a framework that provided clear rules for the sharing of virus 
samples in exchange for benefit sharing. The committee itself had been chaired by the 
Ambassadors of Mexico and Norway and had included WHO member states, industry groups, 
and civic organizations. The framework (resolution WHA64.5) was then brought to the World 
Health Assembly on May 24 2011, where the member states voted to adopt it (WHO News 
Release, 2011). At its core, the agreement sought to ensure that the WHO could continue to 
collect and distribute viral samples to the developed world and pharmaceutical companies in 
exchange for providing more benefits (such as vaccines and medicines) to developing countries 
(WHO, “Benefit Sharing,” n.d.). But in the end, what was absent from the agreement was as 
interesting as what was present. An earlier suggestion to create a major endowment to ensure 
benefit sharing disappeared from the final report. 
 In April, the working group of member states on Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) 
had produced a report entitled “Pandemic Influenza Preparedness: options for sustainable 
financing of benefit sharing.” The goal of the document was to examine how to ensure the 
availability of funds that developing countries would need to obtain vaccines. It laid out the five 
year costs for pandemic influenza preparedness activities, such as disease based surveillance, 
laboratory strengthening, new WHO collaborating centers, increased demand for seasonal 
influenza vaccines in developing countries, augmenting vaccine production in developing 
countries, changing vaccine technology, the use of new adjuvants, and creating stocks of both 
vaccines and medicines. The total cost was approximately $1.121 billion in US dollars. While 
significant, this was much less than the costs in the event of a pandemic, which were estimated at 
$2.98 billion to cover the cost of deploying 276 million courses of vaccine, which represented 
“5.5% of [the] population in countries without access” to vaccine as well as the cost of providing 
anti-retrovirals for 66 million people or “2.25% of [the] population of countries without access 
[to them]” (Open Ended Working Group, 2011, pp. 7-8). 
 This represented a substantial investment and would have been a major step towards 
providing access to needed care in the developing world in the event of a pandemic. To fund this, 
the report suggested the creation of a PIP endowment. In addition, the report suggested that 
countries “could access bilateral funding through the International Monetary Fund Special 
Drawing Rights, similar prearranged International Monetary Fund support mechanisms, and 
World Bank [programs] . . . at the time of a pandemic event” (Open Ended Working Group, 
2011, p. 12). The objective of the endowment was to provide stable and predictable funding to 
meet long term needs for pandemic preparedness. Amongst other funding mechanisms, the PIP 
endowment would have relied on a subscription fee to the Global Influenza Surveillance 
Network and in-kind contributions from industries. Companies would have contributed a 
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percentage of sales of vaccines to the PIP endowment in exchange for access to “candidate 
viruses” for vaccines (Open Ended Working Group, 2011, pp. 13-15). The result would have 
been a substantial fund to address the needs of developing countries in a pandemic. However, 
this portion of the proposal this formed no part of the final draft of the WHO report in 2011.  
 The final report stated instead that influenza “vaccine, diagnostic, and pharmaceutical 
manufacturers using the WHO GIRSRS will make an annual partnership contribution to WHO 
for improving global pandemic influenza preparedness and response. It was decided that the sum 
of the annual contributions shall be equivalent to 50% of the running costs of the WHO GISRS” 
(WHO, 2011, p. 21). This was equivalent to a figure of $28.5 million US, a significant figure, 
though far less than the sum suggested in the original draft of the report, as was the scale of the 
benefits. Still, developing countries did get numerous concessions that were critical to their 
interests. The report recognized “the sovereign right of States over their biological resources. . .” 
(WHO, 2011, p. 4). It also created an oversight system to allow developing countries to track the 
viral samples that they had donated through the Influenza Virus Traceability Mechanism: 
The IVTM is an electronic, internet based system that records the movement of PIP 
biological materials into, within, and to parties outside the WHO GISRS. The purpose of 
the system is to allow users to see where PIP biological materials have been sent. . . . It 
also enables users to see the results of analyses and tests carried out with them (WHO, 
“Influenza Virus,” n.d.)  
The PIP also created Standard Material Transfer Agreements to cover all biological materials 
that moved within the WHO GIRSR. The plan also stated that the WHO would help build 
stockpiles of anti-virals and vaccines for developing countries. This stockpile was to include 150 
million doses of vaccine, with 50 million doses set aside for the location where the outbreak 
began, and 100 million for developing nations (WHO, 2011, p. 19). The key to creating this 
stockpile and other forms of benefit sharing was the Standard Material Transfer Agreement 2. 
This document governed viral samples transferred outside the GISR. These terms merit quoting 
at length because they were central to the WHO’s plan: 
For manufacturers of vaccines and/or anti-virals, the recipient shall commit to at 
least two of the following options: 
A1.  Donate at least 10% of real time pandemic vaccine production to WHO. 
A2.  Reserve at least 10% of real time pandemic vaccine production at 
affordable prices to WHO. 
A3.  Donate at least X treatment courses of needed antiviral medicine for the 
pandemic to WHO. 
A4.  Reserve at least X treatment courses of needed antiviral medicine for the 
pandemic at affordable prices. 
A5.  Grant licenses to manufacturers in developing countries on mutually 
agreed terms that should be fair and reasonable including in respect to 
affordable royalties, taking into account development levels in the country 
of end use of the products, on technology, know-how, products and 
processes for which it holds IPR for the production of (i) influenza 
vaccines (ii) antivirals and/or (iii) diagnostics. 
A6.  Grant royalty-free licences to manufacturers in developing countries or 
grant to WHO royalty-free, non-exclusive licences on IPR, which can be 
sublicensed, for the production of pandemic influenza vaccines, adjuvants, 
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anti-virals products and diagnostics needed in a pandemic. The WHO may 
sublicense these licences to manufacturers in developing countries on 
appropriate terms and conditions and in accordance with sound public 
health principles. (WHO, 2011, p. 34) 
In principle, these requirements gave developing countries access to benefits in return for 
viral sample sharing and embodied the exchange that Indonesia had first proposed in 
2007.  
 From the perspective of the developed states and pharmaceutical companies, the 
PIP ensured the continued flow of viral samples. The PIP stated (6.3.1) that the WHO 
Collecting Centers would give viral samples to “influenza manufacturers on a no 
preference basis” (WHO, 2011, p. 16). This meant that the developed countries would 
continue to have access to vaccines as quickly as possible in the event of a pandemic. 
Significantly, however, these benefits were awarded to developing nations from the 
pharmaceutical industry rather than from developed nations directly, and the agreement 
made no mention of key international organizations (such as the World Bank or IMF). To 
some extent, this was perhaps to be expected, given trends in global health. 
 
The Rise of Transnational Alliances 
 
In the era of globalization, questions of sovereignty and health create new perspectives on 
international order. Niamh Stephenson (Stephenson, 2011, pp. 616-637) has argued that people 
look no longer solely to the nation state for “rights and representation” but rather to an array of 
other transnational actors. Stephenson suggested that the WHO has been a weakening political 
actor because of decades-long trends in which it has been challenged and underfunded. As the 
WHO has worked to securitize health in order to respond to international health challenges, new 
political actors, which she called “aggregates,” have become involved in these affairs. These 
aggregates are alliances between varying actors—developing countries and NGOs, the World 
Health Organization, and pharmaceutical companies—that mobilize around an ideology to 
achieve their health objectives. Stephenson argued that this international order is shaped by 
neoliberal objectives, in particular the need to ensure the unimpeded flow of trade goods. 
Accordingly, health security has become equated with unimpeded trade. In this context, 
Stephenson stated (2011) that nationalist rhetoric, such as that of Supari, has been employed to 
challenge transnational powers and the neoliberal agenda.  
What the Indonesian experience suggests is that in the sphere of global health, nation-
states remain significant actors and are able to challenge international organizations and 
transnational aggregates. From Stephenson’s perspective (2011, p. 622), in 2010, the WHO 
essentially played a mediating role in order to convene a new set of actors to deal with the 
challenge Indonesia raised. Simone Vezzani (2010, p. 681), in contrast, argued in 2009 that the 
Director General’s proposal generally favored the developed countries and pharmaceutical 
companies. In either case, the WHO did not originally seek to advocate for developing countries 
in order to balance their health needs with developed countries’ wishes for viral samples. Instead, 
Indonesia found that it had to fight for its political vision, which it did by framing a narrative 
around biopiracy. As Stephenson notes, from the start, Indonesia referred to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity and insisted that there be a comprehensive solution to virus-sharing based 
on the sharing of benefits (Stephenson, 2011, p. 624). Indonesia’s position focused on more than 
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bird flu alone. If that had not been the case, the WHO might have been able to address 
Indonesia’s immediate concerns in 2007: 
. . . Supari also felt sufficiently emboldened to hold out for more than just a few 
concessions made by the West and to push for a fundamental transformation of 
the virus-sharing mechanism. When, for example, she was approached by the 
WHO with offers of a laboratory upgrade and as much vaccine as they needed in 
February 2007, she turned these offers down. . . . Rather than simply accepting 
these offers of material support and resolving the dispute there and then, the 
Indonesian health minister instead formulated a much stronger demand that made 
Indonesia’s resumption of virus sharing conditional upon a more fundamental 
reformation of the whole virus sharing mechanism. (Elbe, 2010, p. 482) 
Indonesia’s position remained consistent after Supari’s tenure as Minister of Health 
because of a widespread consensus within the government that the virus sharing issue 
entailed broader questions of biopiracy.  
 As Nicolas Rose (2007, pp. 5-6) has noted, modern medicine has become 
increasingly focused on the “molecularization” of medical issues (i.e. the focus on life at 
the molecular level). The debates over viral sample sharing are a classic example of this 
molecular focus, as the debate takes place about the genetic code of viruses. At the same 
time, this debate was different from most biopolitics in that it took place at the 
international level. There were three factors that made this discussion distinctive. First, 
there were no powerful patient advocacy groups for influenza like those that support most 
other diseases. Second, the debate was shaped by “bioeconomics,” which is the effort to 
extract value from the molecularization of medicine (Rose, 2007, pp. 31-39). In this 
instance, pharmaceutical companies were less committed actors than were states not only 
because the profits to be made from influenza vaccines are lower than the profits to be 
made from vaccines for other diseases but also because the health of populations in states 
affected by influenza was of greater central concern to national governments than to the 
pharmaceutical companies. Third, although “biocapital” is located in developing 
countries, particularly India (Rose, 2007, p. 36), vaccine manufacturing remains focused 
in the developed world. This meant that the debate was largely defined in terms of the 
Global North and South and that nation states were key actors in the debate.  
In Global Health Governance, Jeremy Youde (2012, pp.158-159) has argued that 
since the 1980s. there has been a shift from “international health governance” to “global 
health governance,” in which nation-states are not necessarily the critical actors. In the 
debate over virus sample sharing, pharmaceutical companies were powerful and critical 
actors, as their commitments funded benefit sharing. At the same time, nation-state actors 
were essential to this political contest, and they placed the struggle in the context of 
power relations across the developed/developing divide. Scholars such as Appadurai 
(1996, p. 19) have predicted over the last twenty years that the nation-state will cease to 
be the key unit in international affairs. This was not the case in the debate over viral 
sample sharing, which became enmeshed in larger issues between states, such as the 
allegedly neocolonial architecture of global health governance. 
 
Neocolonialism and the WHO’s credibility 
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The World Health Organization recognized the power of the biopiracy argument 
because over most of the four years it took to create the PIP, the organization did not base 
its arguments upon the law but rather upon the need for benefit sharing (Stephenson, 
2011, p. 622). While Indonesia’s argument regarding biopiracy and viral sample sharing 
attracted support in the developing world, it also formed a means to pressure international 
organizations, by depicting them as neo-imperial instruments. This was particularly 
important in the case of the WHO, though Stephenson’s argument perhaps overstated the 
World Health Organization’s weakness. While the organization had issues of 
underfunding, it was the only body capable of convening all the actors to address the 
competing paradigms. Because Indonesia’s biopiracy argument also portrayed the WHO 
as an institution that reflected neo-colonial relationships, it was strongly in the WHO’s 
interests to broker a settlement; that is, the biopiracy argument not only proved more 
influential than a legal/security framework during negotiations with developed countries, 
it also pressured the WHO to act in order to maintain its own credibility. With the rising 
power of the political left in Latin America, Bretton Woods
1
 institutions and key 
international organizations have faced criticism that they act primarily to advance the 
economic interests of the great states. In this political context, as well as given concerns 
that an HPAI pandemic could break out at any moment, a comprehensive resolution to 
the standoff was critical for the WHO. The PIP demonstrated the institution’s continued 
relevance, while protecting it from criticism. With this plan, the WHO could argue that it 
had balanced the interests of diverse nations, in order to make a proposal that best served 
the global public good. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The WHO’s Pandemic Influenza Plan represented a limited victory for front-line states in 
the struggle to contain HPAI. There were a number of reasons for their success. Pharmaceutical 
companies wanted to see an agreement reached and did not oppose incurring some costs in 
exchange for viral samples. The WHO was able to broker a transnational alliance to address the 
issue and resolve a classic collective action problem (Olson, 1971) in which each participant 
would have been worse off following their national interests than if they cooperated. There was 
also the reality that the developing countries controlled the viral samples, which were a resource 
that the major powers wished to obtain. Developed countries also did not have to bear the costs 
for this plan and so had little reason to oppose it. For all of these practical reasons, an agreement 
was feasible.  
 At the same time, the creation of the WHO’s PIP represented a contest between two 
narratives around global health that embodied the conflicting interests of the developed and 
developing world. As Elbe has noted, developed countries applied the language of security to the 
dispute and sought to justify their position based on international law. This attracted media 
attention in wealthy countries and, initially, some support from the WHO. But it also meant that 
military activities in front-line states—such as those conducted at NAMRU 2—were harmed. 
From this perspective, the securitization of health policy had unexpected costs for the United 
States, which was both the most powerful political actor and that state that had done the most to 
securitize influenza (Youde, 2008, pp. 154-158). In contrast, Indonesia’s effort to describe the 
dispute in terms of biopiracy rallied the support of developing countries, particularly the front-
line states, whose viral samples were most important to pandemic preparations. For developing 
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nations, the patenting of traditional plants, as well as the appropriation of indigenous knowledge 
about their medicinal usage, entailed powerful issues that shaped their perception of the dispute. 
While the idea of “viral sovereignty” faced scorn in the wealthy countries, it received a 
sympathetic hearing in Thailand, India, and other developing countries. For Indonesia, the 
dispute was not only central to national interest, but it was also one of principle, as the country 
wanted a systemic resolution to viral sample issues. By framing the issue in terms of biopiracy 
rather than global health inequality, Indonesia suggested that developed countries were actively 
doing something wrong, instead of passively failing to provide charity. The argument also placed 
one biological problem (i.e. the spread of disease) in the context of another (the theft of plants 
and knowledge) in a manner that evoked much broader support. The success of this approach 
will likely lead developing countries to express similar demands not only in the field of health 
(such as mandating the sharing of viral sequences for influenza) but also in intellectual property, 
particularly regarding indigenous rights over medicinal knowledge. In this respect, the benefits-
sharing model integral to PIP will be viewed as a likely model for future agreements in these 
areas. 
                                                        
1 The Bretton Woods conference (also known as the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference), was a 
gathering of representatives from the forty-four Allied countries in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in 1944, during 
which these nations sought to create a new architecture for the global financial system. The term “Bretton Woods 
institutions” refers to the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization, which had 
their roots in this conference. Critics in the developing world argue that these institutions bolster the historically 
powerful position of Western states in the world order. 
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